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Since the #MeToo movement gained popularity, sexual harassment has been a more 
frequent topic of casual conversation. For many in my generation, this national dialogue is shaping 
how we think about the workplace and how we will act in it. For that, I am grateful but not content. 
When I tell people the topic of my thesis, many want to talk to me about how things have gone too 
far in the ‘other direction.’ They don’t understand why discrimination law can mean some comments 
and jokes are no longer allowed in the workplace. This thesis is to explain how utterances can 
constitute discrimination, and thus, why they should not be permitted in such an environment.  
Consider the case of Kevin, Susan, and Will, three co-workers at a corporate office of a large 
technology company. They all share a large office, where each individual has a desk. The three are all 
equals in the office; no one person has more authority than the other, and they all report to the same 
supervisor. Kevin and Will are closer friends with one another than either of them are with Susan. 
After performance reviews are emailed back, this conversation occurs: 
Kevin: Did you guys get your performance reviews back? 
Will: Yep. I didn’t do so well. 
Susan: I actually did fairly well. 
Kevin: Me too, I did better than I expected. 
Will: Well, not all of us have a chest like Susan’s or legs like Kevin’s! 
Kevin laughs at Will’s jokes, but Susan doesn’t find this to be all that funny. She actually finds Will’s 
words, and Kevin’s reaction, to be really upsetting. She hopes Will doesn’t actually think she got a 
good performance review because of her body, but even if he was ‘just joking,’ she feels 
uncomfortable. She didn’t think she worked in a place where that kind of joke was ‘okay.’ This may 
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seem like a “harmless” joke and a case of an unfortunate desk placement, but by the end of this 
thesis, I will prove that the situation above is an instance of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment by clarifying the nature of discrimination, explaining hostile work environment sexual 
harassment, exploring how freedom of speech interacts with harassment law, and applying tools 





Chapter 1: The Nature of Discrimination 
To approach the issue of the nature of discrimination, this chapter will work through a series of 
approximate definitions of discrimination, raising issues with different conceptions in order to arrive 
at an appropriate working definition.  
At first glance, it seems discrimination is just the distinguishing of differences. When we say 
someone has discriminating taste, we mean that they can find differences among options. This sort 
of neutral discrimination, finding variances among things, is commonplace. For example, consider a 
gym that has separate locker rooms for men and women.  The gym discriminates between men and 1
women, but not against either of them. This is an instance of discrimination ​between​, in which 
differences determine treatment, but neither treatment is better nor worse. This thesis, however, 
intends to focus on discrimination ​against​ rather than ​between​, and discrimination for this purpose 
cannot just be different treatment, but instead has to be “disadvantageous treatment”.  2
But just “disadvantageous treatment” is not necessarily discrimination. Consider a case in which 
a toddler can tell the difference between her mother and her brother. The toddler can discriminate 
between the two of them, in the neutral sense of discrimination mentioned above. Imagine this 
toddler is kind to her mother, providing her with affection, but cruel to her brother, crying and 
throwing fits when he is there. In effect, this toddler is distinguishing between her mother and 
brother and providing only her brother with the disadvantageous treatment. Still, we would not say 
the toddler is ​discriminating against ​her brother. 
1 Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2014).​ Born free and equal?: A philosophical inquiry into the nature of discrimination.​ ​Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. Pg 14.  
2 Altman, A. (Winter 2016 Edition), "Discrimination", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/discrimination/>. 
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There is something about what the disadvantageous treatment is ​on the basis of​ that makes it 
discriminatory. For disadvantageous treatment to constitute discrimination, it must occur on the 
basis of social group membership. Social group membership is typically characterized by a societal 
treatment that constrains or enables the individual in ways beyond their control.  This is best 3
explained through example. People buying cars may face societal messages and tax incentives 
encouraging them to buy a hybrid. That is, societal treatment enables them to act in a certain way, 
but it is certainly still their choice to buy a hybrid or not. Thus, people buying cars are not a social 
group, because the societal treatment they face does not affect them in a way beyond their control. 
However, if an individual slashes the tires of a few hybrids, he may be treating hybrid owners in a 
way that constrains them beyond their control. Yet, because there is no different and constraining 
societal treatment of hybrid owners, they are not a social group. This type of social group 
membership must entail a better or worse societal treatment, and that treatment must affect the 
individual beyond their control. For example, doctors constitute a social group. Doctors face societal 
treatment different than non-doctors. Society privileges their communications with patients, licenses 
them to perform medical procedures, and gives them the authority to prescribe medications. Thus, 
doctors face better societal treatment in these contexts. This societal treatment also affects doctors 
beyond their control – doctors do not decide how society treats them, but they face that treatment 
regardless. Therefore, doctors receive better societal treatment, which affects them beyond their 
control, making them a social group.  4
3 Young, I. M. (March 2001) “Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice.” ​Journal of 
Political Philosophy​ 9, no. 1. 
4 The legal recognition of social groups is more limited and varies upon jurisdiction and will be explained later 
in this thesis. Some commonly legally recognized social groups are various races (White people, Black people, 
Latino people, Asian people, etc.), religions (Christians, Jewish people, Muslim people, etc.) sexes (male, 
female, intersex, etc.), the differently abled, etc.  
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But the privileges doctors receive over non-doctors (communications with patients, license to 
perform medical procedures, and the authority to prescribe medications) are not unjust. Doctors 
must go to medical school and become board-certified in order to receive these privileges. Thus, 
non-doctors are not discriminated against when they receive disadvantageous treatment because 
such treatment can be justified: non-doctors do not have the qualifications to receive the privileges 
of doctors. For an act to constitute discrimination, it must be both unfair and disadvantageous 
treatment on the basis of a person’s membership in a social group. For example, refusing to let the 
blind become pilots is a denial of privilege based on their being differently abled, but it is not an 
unfair denial. Allowing them to pilot would endanger everyone’s safety and benefit no one. So, the 
denial of the privilege can be fairly justified, and thus is not discrimination. A better approximate 
definition of discrimination is then unfair and disadvantageous treatment on the basis of a person’s 
membership in a social group. Discrimination has two requirements: it must be both 
disadvantageous and unjustified treatment and based on social group membership.  
So, we’ve established that discrimination has two requirements- it must be unfair and based on 
social group membership. The “unfair treatment” is inherently based in a comparative, because an 
advantage or disadvantage is determined through comparison to the relevant group. One group 
cannot be treated worse without being treated worse than another group, and so the treatment of 
one group must be compared to its relevant comparison class. Still, picking the relevant comparison 
class can be difficult. Take the example of America under Jim Crow laws, where voting was harder 
for Black citizens than for white citizens. Black voters were​ ​being put at a disadvantage because of 
their group membership, as literacy tests and grandfather laws made it more difficult for them to 
vote as compared to their white peers. When those Black citizens are compared to citizens in 
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another country that is a monarchy, where no one can vote, they are no longer at the relative 
disadvantage, but rather, at an advantage. It is harder for Black Americans to vote compared to 
white Americans, but the system allows for Black voters more than a monarchy would. However, 
the citizens of a monarchy are not the relevant comparison classes. It follows that discrimination is 
not relative disadvantage of any social groups to any other, but rather, inequalities in the treatment 
of the relevant comparison classes.   5
Discrimination takes direct and indirect forms, but my thesis will focus on direct discrimination. 
There are many different ways direct discrimination can occur. Consider a high school policy that 
says explicitly “no non-heterosexual couple can run for prom king and queen.” This policy 
disadvantages LGBTQ couples as compared to heterosexual couples by not allowing them the 
‘honor’ of being prom king or queen, and it does so unfairly, because the policy has no reasonable 
justification. It is not like the pilot example, because there is no evidence that heterosexuality is a 
necessary requirement for the ‘duties’ of being prom king or queen. Therefore, the policy is 
discriminatory because it disadvantages a social group (LGBTQ students) relative to the relevant 
comparison class (heterosexual couples) because of their social group, and it does so unfairly (as 
being non-LGBTQ is not vital to being prom queen or king). 
Now consider another school, with no explicit ban on non-heterosexual couples running for 
prom king and queen. Instead, this school has students fill out ballots to elect prom king and queen 
but will only list boys under king and girls under queen.  This ballot policy then effectively prevents 6
5 Altman, A. (Winter 2016 Edition), "Discrimination". 
6 This does not address that having a prom queen and king may exclude non-binary and gender 
non-conforming students, and thus be an act of discrimination in and of itself.  
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non-heterosexual couples from running.  This school’s policy is discriminatory because it unfairly 7
disadvantages members of one social group (LGBTQ couples) as compared to another 
(heterosexual couples) by not letting the LGBTQ couples run, and for doing so without a fair 
justification. Although the ballot policy is not explicit in banning non-heterosexual couples from 
running, it effectively prohibits them from doing so by requiring the couples to be made up of a boy 
and a girl. Both of these are direct because each policy is disadvantaging one social group (LGBTQ 
students) with respect to another (heterosexual students), and that disadvantage arises directly from 
the policy.  
Additionally, discrimination being direct does not necessarily mean it is motivated by hatred or 
hostility. It often occurs because of indifference or ignorance. Consider a student prom committee 
designing ballots for the school to vote on prom queen and king. They type up a ballot listing only 
boys under king and only girls under queen, effectively preventing non-heterosexual couples from 
running. The students on this committee do not hate LGBTQ people, but they are ignorant of the 
fact that their action is exclusionary. The students have then written a policy that unfairly 
disadvantages the social group of LGBTQ couples as compared to heterosexual couples, not out of 
bias or hostility, but out of indifference. However, the effect of the policy is the same. The policy 
still directly discriminates against LGBTQ couples. It is still an instance of direct discrimination 
because there is an unfair disadvantaging of one social group as compared to another arising directly 
from the student committee’s policy.  
Discrimination being direct does not necessarily mean it is intentional. Consider a brand-new 
principal joining a school. On his first day, the prom committee asks for his approval of ballots, 
7 This is not to say that a couple constituted by a boy and girl would be inherently heterosexual, but merely 
that this policy would prevent many non-heterosexual couples from running.  
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needing his signature before they can be copied and distributed. Busy with other things, the principal 
has the students place the ballot approval on a pile of paperwork he has to sign. Later in the day, the 
principal quickly reads through it, does not think of LGBTQ students, and does not find anything 
wrong with it. He signs and approves the ballot that only lists boys under king and girls under queen, 
and effectively prevents non-heterosexual couples from running.  The principal then has continued 8
the policy without the aim of discriminating. He maintains the policy that unfairly disadvantages the 
social group of LGBTQ couples as compared to heterosexual couples. It is still directly 
discriminating against LGBTQ couples, even if the principal did not intend to do so. Furthermore, it 
is an instance of direct discrimination because there is an unfair disadvantaging of one social group 
as compared to another arising directly from the principal’s policy.  
 Indirect discrimination is more difficult to characterize, and there is controversy over whether 
what is described as indirect discrimination is actually discrimination. Indirect discrimination is 
typically characterized by policies that, because of outside forces, result in the disadvantaging of 
members of a social group.​  When such discrimination occurs, it is typically not because the policy 9
or actor was discriminatory, but because of a variety of factors affecting enforcement and producing 
an unjust outcome.   10
One such example of indirect discrimination may be in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). Prior to its 
decision, Georgia still had anti-sodomy laws that banned oral and anal sex. The statute was written 
with the intention of banning oral and anal sex among all couples.  Later, Griswold v. Connecticut 11
8 This is not to say that a couple constituted by a boy and girl would be inherently heterosexual, but merely 
that this policy would prevent many non-heterosexual couples from running.  
9 Altman, A. (Winter 2016 Edition), "Discrimination". 
10 Ibid. 
11 One could argue that the motivation for outlawing such sodomy is rooted in a heterosexist view of 
sexuality, in which case, this may not be an instance of indirect discrimination but rather direct discrimination. 
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(1965) established privacy in such matters among married couples, rendering such anti-sodomy laws 
unconstitutional when applied to married couples. Then Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) established the 
same privacy protection for unmarried heterosexual couples, meaning the anti-sodomy laws could 
not be applied to unmarried heterosexual couples. So, although the law itself didn’t specify anything 
about sexuality, other cases regarding privacy in heterosexual relationships made it unconstitutional 
to enforce on heterosexual couples. Thus, the law effectively banned those acts among only 
homosexual couples. The legislation is then an example of indirect discrimination, as it does not 
explicitly single out a social group in the text and was not  intended to apply to only that social 
group, but in its application, it disproportionately disadvantaged that social group by opening them 
and only them up for prosecution. Unlike the prom examples, the sodomy laws were not motivated 
by bias or indifference regarding non-heterosexual couples.​ ​Indirect discrimination is typically found 
in applications of laws and not directly from the stated policy. In the example of sodomy laws, it is 
the evolution and application of the law, not the policy directly, that discriminates against 
homosexual couples.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore discrimination in the legal sense. Such discrimination is 
the unjust and disadvantageous treatment of a social group, but the law is narrower than 
philosophers in defining a social group. For discrimination to be legally recognized, it has to be on 
the basis of someone’s perceived race, religion, gender, and/or sexuality.  This is not to say that the 12
groups mentioned are the only socially salient ones, but rather, the only legally recognized ones. 
Additionally, the way anti-discrimination laws are written, different social groups are protected under 
For the purposes of this thesis and illustrating indirect discrimination, however, an investigation of the 
potential biases of early lawmakers is not essential.  
12 Lippert-Rasmussen. K. (2014)​ Born free and equal?: A philosophical inquiry into the nature of discrimination. 
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different jurisdictions. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin.”  It is then illegal on the 13
federal level to discriminate on the basis of membership in any of those stated social groups, but 
there are other social groups that different states prohibit employment discrimination against. For 
example, if a national company refused to hire LGBTQ people because of their sexual orientation, 
they are committing an illegal act of discrimination in California but not in Texas.  California state 14
law establishes that LGBTQ people are a legally protected social group, but Texas state law does 
not. Furthermore, even certain cities have anti-discrimination laws that protect social groups that 
state and federal law ignores. New York City has outlawed discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity.  Unlike the rest of the state, in New York City, those who identify as “agender, bigender, 15
butch, female/woman/feminine, female to male (FTM), femme, gender diverse, gender fluid, 
genderqueer, male/man/masculine, male to female (MTF), man of trans experience, pangender, or 
woman of trans experience,” are in a legally recognized and protected social group.  The social 16
groups that count as legally protected from discrimination vary by jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the legal definition of discrimination requires some legal harm present in the 
disadvantaging of the social group. Employment discrimination has the tangible harm of a loss in 
job benefits or promotions. If an employer were to refuse to hire Black people, he would be denying 
that social group the opportunity to make money, receive benefits, and participate in that workforce. 
Such discrimination then has a legally recognized harm stemming from the disadvantaging of that 
13 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1964) 
14 Movement Advancement Project. "Equality Maps: State Non-Discrimination Laws." 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws 
15 New York City Commission on Human Rights Legal Enforcement Guidance on Discrimination on the 




social group. If an employer were to refuse to be friends with Black people, he would be denying 
them his friendship and perhaps disadvantaging them. Nevertheless, the denial of friendship is not a 
legally recognized harm, and thus, his actions would not be legally actionable discrimination. So, 
discrimination in the legal sense must be unfair and disadvantageous treatment based on social 
group membership and thus constitutes a legally recognized harm.  
Within the legal definition, discrimination can be classified as organizational or structural. 
Organizational discrimination occurs when an organization’s member engages in discrimination 
while acting in their capacity as such a member.  If a principal appointed by the school board to 17
enact a policy prohibiting interracial couples from running for prom queen or king, that school 
board would be engaging in organizational discrimination. Even though the principal is an 
individual, the collective school board has vested its authority in the principal to act as its 
representative. As a representative of their organization, he has enacted a discriminatory policy. 
Thus, the organization is guilty of organizational discrimination.  
But if that principal, on his own time, decided to not to hire any black people as domestic 
workers in his home, the school board would not have committed organizational discrimination. 
The principal is acting as a private employer, not an agent of the school board. Because he is not 
acting with the power the organization grants him, his actions are not organizational discrimination. 
Of course, his actions are employment discrimination and illegal, but because he is acting as a 
private employer and not in his capacity as a principal, it is not organizational discrimination. 
Organizational discrimination often overlaps with illegal discrimination, but organizational 
discrimination is not always illegal. Religious organizations, for example, are legally allowed to 
17 Altman, A. (Winter 2016 Edition), "Discrimination". 
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discriminate against women or members of different religions in hiring for ministerial positions.  18
So, although the legal notion is concerned with organizational discrimination, it does not always 
forbid it.  
Discrimination can also be structural. Structural discrimination is characterized by societal 
institutions continually and unjustly generating “disproportionately disadvantageous outcomes” for 
members of socially salient groups.  Such discrimination concerns the effects of systematic 19
disadvantages of social groups. This is illustrated by the funding mechanism of the United States 
public school system. Public schools are funded by property taxes, which are determined by 
property values. Higher property values mean more property taxes and thus more funding for 
schools. Because of this nation’s history of oppression and denying Black people opportunities to 
accumulate wealth and property, it is unsurprising that they are more likely to live in heavily 
populated areas with lower property values. Thus, Black students are more likely to attend schools 
with less funding and resources, putting them at a disadvantage relative to their white peers. The 
less-funded schools often have leaky roofs, broken windows, and peeling paint.  They also are 20
unable to afford field trips, have fewer after school-activities, and face larger class sizes resulting in 
busier teachers with less time to spend per student.  In this example, the disadvantageous outcome 21
is the poor facilities generated by the societal institution of property-tax funded schools. It is not one 
particular racist person committing an act against Black people, but rather, a systematic disadvantage 
of lower-income students who, because of the nation’s racist past, are often people of color. 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) [Section 703] (1964)  
19 Altman, A. (Winter 2016 Edition), "Discrimination" 
20 ​Turner, C. (2016, April 18). Why America's Schools Have A Money Problem [Radio series episode]. 
In ​Morning Edition​. NPR. 
21 ​Strauss, V. (2018). ​This is what inadequate funding at a public school looks and feels like — as told by an entire faculty​. 
Washington: WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post. 
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Although there are some cases where structural discrimination was ruled illegal, the Supreme Court 
ruled in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) that the property tax basis of 
school funding is not illegal discrimination. Here, as in organizational discrimination, the legal 




Chapter 2: Hostile Work Environment as Discrimination  
In the previous chapter of this thesis, I established a legal definition of discrimination as the 
unfair treatment on the basis of membership in a legally protected social group resulting in a legally 
recognized harm. In this chapter, I discuss and define discrimination on the basis of sex. 
In order to understand discrimination on the basis of sex, sex must be defined. Sex is a 
biological classification based on physical characteristics.  Sex is distinct from gender, and the two 22
often but not always correspond.  Traditionally, it has been thought that people with the sex 23
classification “male” were men, and those with the sex classification “female” were women. But 
equating sex classification with gender identification ignores those who are transgender, non-binary, 
gender non-conforming, etc. Sex classification is the application of “socially agreed upon biological 
criteria” that are used to designate an individual as male, female, or intersex.  Sex is more narrowly 24
defined by physical characteristics, but the meaning of gender is more contentious.  
Feminist philosophical thought has commonly considered gender to be the social 
performance of sex. In 1949, Simone de Beauvoir wrote​, ​“One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman,” and argued that gender was the social or cultural meaning of sex.  Later, Judith Butler’s 25
work in “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” similarly argued that gender is the social 
performance of sex,  influenced by societal and cultural expectations of one’s sex classification.  26 27
The dominant view in philosophical literature is that because gender is influenced by cultural 
22 ​Oakley, A. (1972) ​Sex, gender and society​. London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd. 158. 
23 ​Ibid.  
24 ​West, C. & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). "Doing Gender." ​Gender and Society​ 1, no. 2: 125-51.  
25 Beauvoir, S. D. (1973). ​The Second Sex​. New York: Vintage Books. 301.  
26 Butler, J. (1988). Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 




expectations, it is linked to social positioning and subordination.  Some philosophers, like Sally 28
Haslanger, believe the genders are synonymous with social subordination, defining ‘women’ as those 
systematically subordinated because of their perceived female reproductive ability.​  This is a just a 29
brief but incomplete sketch of the complex and evolving discussion of the sex-gender distinction.  
One issue with the concepts of sex and gender operative in law is that sex and gender are 
not always defined and, often, the law makes no distinction between the two. For the purposes of 
this paper, we will use the traditional definition of sex as the biological classification of an individual 
as male, female, or intersex. The court does not always recognize the sex/gender distinction. In fact, 
it often conflates the two, using gender and sex discrimination to mean the same thing. This is 
changing, as discrimination based on gender identity becomes more widely understood.  This 30
chapter will focus on the traditional legally recognized definition of sex but will have to examine 
cases in which gender and sex are conflated.  
Defining sex as the biological classification of an individual as male, female, or intersex, the 
legal understanding of sex discrimination is the unfair treatment of an individual on the basis of their 
legally recognized sex. The law does not recognize all sex classifications nor all gender classifications, 
and thus, what counts as a legally recognized sex often depends on local and state laws. For example, 
in New York City, Washington state, Oregon, and California, birth certificates offer labels of male, 
female, or “X”. Maine and Washington D.C. allow a third gender on driver’s licenses but not birth 
certificates. Kansas birth certificates and driver licenses, however, list only male and female on birth 
28 Mikkola, M. (Winter 2017). "Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy​, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/feminism-gender/>. 
29 ​Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?. ​Noûs,​ 34: pg 
38. 
30 Davis, H. (2014). Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: An Intersectional 
Critique. ​Perspectives on Politics,​ ​12​(1), 45-60. doi:10.1017/S1537592713003708 
18 
 
certificates.  Thus, someone who does not identify as male or female may be recognized on their 31
birth certificate in California but not Kansas. Or in Maine, someone identifying as non-binary may 
have a driver’s license indicating this identification but still have a birth certificate that says male or 
female. Because different sexes are recognized in different states and even on different forms within 
each state, an individual’s “legally recognized sex” can vary upon jurisdiction.  
 The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) defines sex discrimination as 
“treating someone (an applicant or employee) unfavorably because of that person's sex.”  This 32
chapter will provide a brief history and identification of one such form of sex-based discrimination, 
sexual harassment. In the United States, federal law outlaws sexual harassment, arguing it is a form 
of sex-based discrimination and thus violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Federal regulation 33
defines sexual harassment as:  
“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or 
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  34
31 Newman, A. (2018, September 27). Male, Female or ‘X’: The Push for a Third Choice on Official 
Forms. ​The New York Times​. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/nyregion/gender-neutral-birth-certificate.html 
32 https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm 
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1964) 
34 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (1999) 
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Sections 1-2 of that law identify the subset of sexual harassment considered “quid pro quo.” Such 
harassment is typically defined as sexual requests or threats that are made a condition of 
employment or influence employment decisions.  This is sex-based discrimination because it is 35
unfair treatment, as it attempts to force the victim of the harassment to choose between yielding to 
sexual demands or their job, and it does so because of the victim’s sex.  
Even within “quid pro quo harassment,” the law recognizes distinctions. Section 1 of this 
law outlines harassment that occurs when the sexual requests or threats are made as a condition of 
employment, while section 2 refers to cases in which such threats influence employment decisions. 
To illustrate these various forms of sexual harassment, consider an example. Suppose Jane 
interviews at a corporate office as an assistant to John. Here, Jane is simply an interviewee, not an 
employee. John tells Jane she has to have sex with him if she wants the job. Jane, the interviewee, 
first thinks John is kidding. But John continues in his ultimatum, insisting that she must have sex 
with him to get the position. Jane then has to choose between yielding to John’s sexual demands or 
not getting the job. Jane is a victim of the type of sexual harassment outlined by section 1, as John is 
explicitly asking for a sexual favor as a condition of Jane’s employment. Here, it is important to note 
that someone like Jane, a non-employee, can still be a victim of sexual harassment.  
Let’s say John got a new assistant, Kelly. He is Kelly’s boss, and has the power to hire or fire 
her. One night, John asks Kelly out on a date and tells her he thinks rejection is a fireable offense. 
Kelly asks if he’s joking, but John insists he’s being genuine and sincere in asking her out. By 
implying she could be fired for rejecting his advances, John is the implicitly making sexual favors a 
condition of Kelly’s employment. Kelly then has to choose between dating her boss or losing her 
35 Welsh, S. (1999) "GENDER AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT." ​Annual Review of Sociology​, p. 169. 
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job. Thus, John has committed the first type of sexual harassment outlined by section 1, by making 
the submission to his sexual demands a term or condition of Kelly’s employment. He treats Kelly 
unfairly, and he does so on the basis of her sex, making him guilty of sex discrimination.  
The form of sexual harassment outlawed in section 2 occurs when an employer makes 
employment decisions about the employee based on the employee’s response to the employer’s 
sexual advances. Suppose Sally is in charge of performance reviews at a corporate office. One night, 
Sally tells Sam that he has to have sex with her to get a good performance review and thus a 
promotion. Sam is then a victim of the second type of sexual harassment. Sally leads Sam to believe 
she is making an employment decision about him based on his response to her asking for a sexual 
favor. No matter Sam’s reaction, he is sexually harassed. If he submits or rejects Sally’s advances, he 
is doing so thinking Sally will make her employment decision off that choice. He is put into the 
position of having to have sex with his boss or face a bad performance review. It is unfair for Sally 
to treat him that way, and she is doing so because of Sam’s sex/gender. Sally is guilty of sex 
discrimination because she treats Sam unfairly and does so on the basis of his gender.  
The first two forms of sexual harassment discussed above are known as “quid quo pro” 
sexual harassment because they attempt to exchange something (sexual favors) for something 
(positive employment decisions). But federal code also mentions a third type of sexual harassment 
that occurs when sexual advances, requests, or conduct, have “the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.”  This is known as hostile work environment sexual harassment. But the 36
federal government did not legally recognize this form of harassment as gender discrimination until 
36 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (1999) 
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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986)​. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized hostile work 
environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, and thus illegal under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
The plaintiff, Michelle Vinson, worked at Meritor Savings Bank as a teller trainee in 1974. 
Over the next four years, she would earn promotions to teller, head teller, and assistant branch 
manager based entirely on her own merit.  Vinson testified that in 1975, her boss Sidney Taylor 37
invited her to dinner and suggested they begin a sexual relationship.  When Vinson declined, 38
Taylor said she “owed him since he obtained the job for her.”  Unlike cases one and two, in which 39
the harasser had the authority to fire the victim of the harassment, Taylor did not have the authority 
to fire, promote, demote, or make employment decisions about Vinson. However, Vinson did not 
know this, and then began a sexual relationship with Taylor, consenting out of fear of losing her job.
 Over the next two years, Vinson faced not only Taylor’s sexual demands, but his fondling, 40
indecent exposure, and crude sexual comments while at their place of work.   41
What Vinson faced was not like the first two forms of sexual harassment outlined above. 
She was not faced with an explicit or implicit asking for a sexual favor as a condition of her 
employment, nor was her sexual conduct used as the basis for employment decisions. Vinson and 
her lawyers argued that although she faced no explicit offer of exchange of sexual favors for job 
benefits or threat of job loss, Taylor’s behavior created a hostile work environment, which 
disadvantaged her because of her sex.  The court unanimously agreed that this claim constituted sex 42








discrimination. In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist found ​“Without question, when a 
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
discriminate[s] on the basis of sex.”  Although there was no exchange of employment benefits for 43
Vinson’s submission to Taylor’s sexual demands, the court acknowledged that this work 
environment treated Vinson worse because of her sex. Compared to the relevant comparison class, 
her male equals at the bank, she was put at a relative disadvantage. She had to deal with Taylor’s 
demands, remarks, and fondling, while they did not. Thus, Vinson was harmed by Taylor’s actions. 
Not in tangible job-related consequences (like a demotion or firing), but in having unequal access to 
her workplace. Taylor’s harassment of Vinson created a hostile environment that constituted a 
denial of Vinson’s equal access to the workplace.  
Vinson was harmed in a legally recognized way. The law recognizes some harms and does 
not recognize others. Consider two examples. In the first, I lie to my friend, saying I am not 
planning a birthday party. I do have a birthday party and do not invite her, but she has spent a great 
deal of her own money on a present for me, which I gladly take. She finds out, feels betrayed and 
hurt, can no longer trust me, and has lost the money she spent on my present. She is thus harmed. 
Now consider another example, in which a friend comes to me at my workplace, where I am a 
hedge fund manager. I tell her I can triple her investment in two years, so she gives me a great deal 
of her own money to invest. I cannot triple her investment; I have actually just lied to her and am 
running a Ponzi scheme. She finds out, feels betrayed and hurt, can no longer trust me, and has lost 
the money she gave me to invest. Although the impact on my friend may be identical, the law only 
recognizes the harm in the second case, not the first. 
43Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson​, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986).  
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One way to understand why the law covers some but not all harms is through the harm 
principle. The harm principle, as outlined by John Stuart Mill, argues that in deciding the law, the 
government must find the balance of limiting the personal freedom of one citizen to protect another 
from harm.  Limiting the personal freedom of one citizen can be a harm, so the law must only 44
interfere when the harm to another person is greater than the harm of limiting the autonomy of the 
citizen.  Mill finds that “the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 45
member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.”  Consider the case 46
of Vinson and Taylor. The law is limiting the personal freedom of Taylor by finding his conduct – 
the inappropriate sexual requests, sexual comments, and fondling in the workplace – to be illegal. He 
can no longer act freely in those ways. But the law weighs Taylor’s loss of autonomy against the 
harm done to Vinson – dealing with Taylor’s demands, remarks, and fondling while her male 
co-workers did not, and thus, having unequal access to her workplace. The harm of unequal access 
on the basis of sex is a legally recognized harm of sex-based discrimination. Thus, the court found 
that the harm done to Vinson is worse than the harm that would be done to Taylor in limiting his 
conduct. The law then exercised its power over Taylor by outlawing his conduct in order to protect 
Vinson from the harm of a hostile work environment.  
Because Taylor’s conduct created an environment hostile to Vinson because of her sex, he 
effectively denied her equal access to her workplace as compared to her male counterparts. In this 
44 ​Stanton-Ife, J. (Winter 2016). "The Limits of Law". ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/law-limits/>. 
45Ibid. 
46 Mill, J. S. (1947). ​Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government​, London: Dent. 
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case, the environment is only hostile to Vinson because she is a woman, making it a form of 
sex-based discrimination: it puts an unjust burden upon women on the basis of their sex.  
It is important to note that this case was the beginning of the court’s recognition of hostile 
work environment claims. In the next chapter, I will analyze some precedent-setting cases of hostile 




Chapter 3: Cases of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment  
In the previous chapter, I established a legal definition of discrimination on the basis of sex 
and explained the Supreme Court case that acknowledged hostile work environment sexual 
harassment as an instance of sex-based discrimination. This chapter looks at three different cases of 
hostile work environment sexual harassment, explaining how each are instances of sex-based 
discrimination.  
1 § Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.  
In ​Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993),​ the Supreme Court reaffirmed that hostile work 
environment protections extend to conduct that does not lead the employee to suffer physical or 
psychological injury.​  Rather, as established in Meritor, such an environment is an act of 47
discrimination because it constitutes unequal access to the workplace. ​Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc. 
(1993) ​then established that a hostile work environment occurs when the victim perceives that the 
environment is abusive or hostile and a “reasonable person” would agree.  The victim does not 48
have to prove that the hostile environment caused a physical or psychological injury to prove 
discrimination.  
Teresa Harris worked at Forklift Systems, Inc., as a manager under the supervision of 
Charles Hardy, president of the company.​  Throughout her time at work, Hardy made degrading 49
comments to Harris, calling her “a dumb ass woman,” suggesting they go to a hotel to negotiate her 
raise, and making sexual innuendos.​  Harris confronted Hardy, who claimed to be surprised that 50






Harris took offense, said he was only joking and promised to stop if Harris stayed in her position.​  51
But less than a month after that conversation, when Harris was making a deal with a customer, 
Hardy asked, “What did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday night?”.​  Harris then filed a 52
claim that Hardy’s conduct created a hostile work environment for her because she was a woman.  53
The lawyers representing Forklift Systems, Inc., conceded that Hardy’s comments were 
offensive to Harris and to a “reasonable” woman.  However, they argued that these comments 54
alone were not so severe that they interfered with Harris’ work performance or caused her 
psychological injury.  The court agreed, but found that a hostile work environment need not 55
interfere with work performance or cause injury to be discriminatory under Title VII. Rather, “​the 
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work 
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends 
Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.”​  Thus, sex discrimination occurs not only when the 56
employee suffers psychological injury or negative work performance, but when both the victim and 
a “reasonable person” would find the environment to be hostile because of the employee’s sex. The 
court found that the harm is in the unequal access to the workplace, not just tangible job-related or 
psychological consequences.  
2 § Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.  
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (1991), the United States District Court of 
Florida established that the workplace presence of images of nude or partially nude women in 
51 Ibid. 







sexually submissive poses can create a hostile work environment that constitutes sex-based 
discrimination. Plaintiff Lois Robinson worked for Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., (JSI) as a 57
welder.​  JSI employed very few women as craftworkers (less than five percent) and never had a 58
woman Leaderman, Quarterman, Assistant Foreman, Foreman, Superintendent, Coordinator, 
Vice-President or President.​  Throughout the JSI workplace, there were pictures of nude and 59
partially nude women ripped from magazines such as “Playboy” and “Penthouse.”​  JSI employees 60
were encouraged to ask permission before hanging any materials up, but many in management had 
such images displayed in their offices, and nude images were not technically prohibited.​  61
Additionally, “Playboy,” “Penthouse,” and other pornographic materials were often read on the job 
by Robinson’s co-workers, although the reading of magazines or newspapers was prohibited by JSI. 
 Workers at JSI were encouraged by management to hang vendors advertising calendars, which 62
contained images of nude and partially nude women posing pornographically with various tools and 
supplies.​  None of these calendars ever contained men in such poses.  Robinson not only had to 63 64
deal with the pornographic images on the wall, but ​graffiti in her workspace that said: “lick me you 
whore dog bitch,” “eat me,” and “pussy.”   ​Furthermore, employees and supervisors frequently 65
made demeaning and overtly sexual comments about women to Robinson, including her supervisor, 
who said: ​“women are only fit company for something that howls,” “there's nothing worse than 
57 ​Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,​ Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 










having to work around women,” and when asked by Robinson about her assignment: “I don't know, 
I don't care where you go. You can go flash the sailors if you want.”​  66
The lawyers for JSI argued that this was culturally ingrained practice at such a shipyard.  67
They cited two other shipyards, Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp and Colona Shipyard, with a 
similar gender imbalance (less than 10-15% women).​  Like JSI, Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock 68
Corp and Colona have images of nude and partially nude women in the shops and locker rooms, but 
no complaints about the pictures or a hostile environment were ever filed.  However, the court 69
found this attempt to provide “social context” for the behavior and practices of JSI to be 
immaterial. The absence of complaints at the other two shipyards does not mean their work 
environments are not hostile and is not relevant to determining if JSI had a hostile work 
environment.  70
Ultimately, the court ruled that due to the intensive and pervasive nature of the images hung 
up around JSI, “the presence of the pictures, even if not directed at offending a particular female 
employee, sexualizes the work environment to the detriment of all female employees.”​  Thus, the 71
images created a hostile work environment for Robinson because of her sex, and therefore, denied 
her equal access to the workplace. Because of this, JSI’s condoning of the displayed images and 
graffiti constitute sexual harassment and therefore sex-based discrimination.  
66 Ibid. 







Some free speech scholars argue that this understanding of hostile environment harassment 
can restrict free speech.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), it was the demands of sexual 72
favors that made the work environment hostile. In Robinson (1991), part of the hostile work 
environment was pornography and sexual imagery, which are in many cases considered 
constitutionally protected speech.  The court found that the posters, pictures, and calendars 73
mentioned in ​Robinson (1991)​, including those with nude and partially nude women and the photos 
ripped from “Penthouse” and “Playboy,” were sexually suggestive and thus created a hostile work 
environment for Robinson.​  They established a now oft-cited standard, stating: 74
“A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it depicts a person of either sex who is not 
fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to or ordinarily accepted for the 
accomplishment of routine work in and around the shipyard and who is posed for the 
obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to private portions of his or her body.”​  75
Some scholars think that much art, which historically has First Amendment protections even in the 
workplace, would fall under this definition.  The next chapter will address the free speech principle 76
and explain its limitations concerning cases of sexual harassment. 
3 § Holman v. Indiana 
72 ​Volokh, E. (1996). Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment 
Harassment. ​Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law,​ ​17​(20), 305-312. 
73 ​United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,​ 529 U.S. 803 (2000) 
74 ​Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,​ Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
75 Ibid. 




In Holman v. Indiana (2000), the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals ruled that 
a supervisor who harasses both his male and female employees by asking for sexual favors is not 
guilty of sex-based discrimination.   77
The plaintiffs in this case were Steven and Karen Holman, a married couple, working at the 
Indiana Department of Transportation.  The Holman’s both worked under the supervision of the 78
male shop foreman, Gale Ulrich. They alleged that Ulrich had sexually solicited and harassed each of 
them individually, touching their bodies and asking for sexual favors.  When such requests for 79
sexual favors were denied, Ulrich retaliated against them.   80
However, the court did not find in favor of the Holmans. Rather, they found that Ulrich was 
not guilty of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because he did not discriminate 
on the basis of sex. They ruled:  
Title VII does not cover the “equal opportunity” or “bisexual” harasser, then, because such 
a person is not ​discriminating​ on the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) 
than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).  81
The great irony of this case is that in harassing Steven Holman as much as he harassed Karen 
Holman, Ulrich was able to defeat legal action against him. If he were to have harassed only Karen 
Holman and not Steve Holman, or vice versa, the court would have found him guilty of sex-based 
discrimination. It was in harassing both victims, and effectively causing ​more​ harm than if he had 
harassed only one,​ ​that Ulrich was able to prove he did not discriminate ​at all​.  
77 ​Holman v. Indiana​, 211 F.3d 399, 400–01 (7th Cir. 2000) 
78 Ibid. 





I disagree with the court’s ruling and argue that Ulrich’s mistreatment of Steven Holman and 
Karen Holman was an act of discrimination. Using Catharine MacKinnon’s dominance model, we 
can understand that there is societal subordination of women upheld by institutions that perpetuate 
the dominance of men.  To fully understand this model, recall the definition of discrimination from 82
the first chapter of this thesis. Discrimination is unfair and unjustified treatment on the basis of 
social group membership in a legally protected social group resulting in a legally recognized harm​. 
The “unfair treatment” is inherently based in a comparative, because an advantage or disadvantage is 
determined through comparison to the relevant group. One group cannot be treated worse without 
being treated worse than another group, and so the treatment of one group must be compared to 
their relevant comparison class. In cases of sex discrimination, the court typically considers men to 
be the relevant comparison class for women, and women to be the relevant comparison class for 
men. Discrimination that occurs on the basis of sex when women are being treated worse than men 
because they are women, or when men are being treated worse than women because they are men. 
Thus, the court in Holman v. Indiana (2000) found that Ulrich may have mistreated Steven Holman 
because he was a man and Karen Holman because she was a woman, but neither one was treated 
worse than the other, and so no discrimination occurred.  
MacKinnon finds that this type of analysis, based on a direct comparison of treatment, 
ignores larger societal power structures. Particularly, MacKinnon finds that men’s sexual domination 
of women maintains a male-dominance structure.  She argues that societal and systemic inequalities 83
82 MacKinnon, C. (1987). ​Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law​. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
83 MacKinnon, C. (1987). ​Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law​.  
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for women in the workforce are reinforced and perpetuated by sexual harassment.  Such 84
inequalities include horizontal segregation, the statistical domination of a gender within certain 
gendered professions.  For example, women are underrepresented in manual occupations (e.g. 85
manufacturing, construction, transportation) and overrepresented in non-manual occupations (e.g. 
nursing, social work, childcare).  Vertical segregation refers to gendered status differentials within 86
these professions.  Men dominate the highest status occupations within the manual and 87
non-manual sectors of the economy.  MacKinnon also points out inequalities in sex-defined work, 88
professions in which one’s sex is considered essential to the position, and in income;​ on average, 
men have a greater income than women​.  Although MacKinnon’s work was published in 1979, 89
recent empirical evaluations show that the US continues to face these gendered societal and systemic 
inequalities within the workforce.  90
Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that these inequalities stem from a social context that 
defines womanhood through women’s sexualized bodies and compliance with male sexual advances.
 MacKinnon’s argument has a clear historical precedent; the exchange of sex for survival, through 91
marriage or sex work, has ensured that women were sexually available to men and economically 
84 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​ (19 ed.). Yale 
University Press. 9-23. 
85 ​Ibid. 
86 ​Charles, M. (2003). Deciphering Sex Segregation: Vertical and Horizontal Inequalities in Ten National 
Labor Markets. Acta Sociologica, 46(4), 267–287. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001699303464001 
87 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​. 9-23. 
88 ​Ibid. 
89 ​Income inequality is measured differently by various authors; sometimes adjusted to control for different 
profession choices, sometimes not. This thesis will not delve into the many different methodologies used to 
prove income inequality. 
90 Charles, M. (2003). Deciphering Sex Segregation: Vertical and Horizontal Inequalities in Ten National 
Labor Markets. 267–287. 
91 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​. 174-178. 
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dependent on them.  Women in the workplace exist within a larger historical and social context that 92
values their bodies, and not men’s bodies, for sex. This is not to say that the larger historical and 
social context has been good for all men, or even that such context places the ‘proper’ value on 
men’s bodies. Men’s bodies can certainly be sexualized within a workplace and men can certainly be 
sexually harassed. But the societal context in which women exist in the workforce is different than 
that of men. Men do not have a history of their manhood being defined through their objectified, 
sexualized bodies, nor do they have a history of being economically dependent on women. Thus, 
gender in the workplace exists within a larger historical and social context that values the bodies of 
women for sex and does not do the same for men.​ Thus, ​MacKinnon argues that the sexual 
harassment of women is a practice of male sexual dominance that reinforces the male dominant 
power structure.   93
In Holman v. Indiana (2000), Ulrich sexualized both Steven and Karen Holman, but he did 
so within a societal structure of male dominance. There is a societal history of women having to 
exchange of sex for survival, through marriage or sex work, that ensured that women were sexually 
available to men and economically dependent on them. Thus, when Ulrich sexualized Karen 
Holman, because of the history of women in the workplace, he was reinforcing a structure of male 
sexual dominance. When Ulrich sexualized Steven Holman, Ulrich was still reinforcing the male 
sexual dominance by sexualizing the employee/boss relationship. Regardless of the gender of the 
individual Ulrich demands sexual favors from, Ulrich’s sexualization of the workplace maintains the 
male dominance structure, which hurts women more than men through horizontal segregation, 
vertical segregation, income inequality, and sex-defined work.  
92 ​Ibid. 
93 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​. 
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 Thus, when you compare the treatment of the Holman’s, the two are sexualized in the same 
way, and both have to work in a male dominant structure perpetuated by Ulrich. But Karen Holman 
will be hurt more by such a structure than Stephen will, because the harms of the sexualization of 
women in the workplace - horizontal segregation, vertical segregation, income inequality, and 
sex-defined work - most affect women. Ulrich’s actions mean that Karen Holman faces worse 
treatment at work because she is a woman. Even when sexual harassment occurs identically to a man 
and a woman, that sexual harassment is a practice of male sexual dominance, which maintains the 
societal subordination of women, and thus, is an act of sex discrimination.  Because the ‘equal 94
opportunity’ harasser exists within a society that sexualizes the workplace to uphold male sexual 
dominance, their harassment is an act of sex-based discrimination. This dominance model of 
analysis will be applied to the case introduced at the start of this thesis in the final chapter.    




Chapter 4: The Free Speech Principle  
In the previous chapter, I looked at three different cases of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment, explaining how each is an instance of sex-based discrimination. Those cases raised some 
interesting free speech concerns. In this chapter, I will outline what free speech is, what it does, and 
what we need to justify the regulation of speech, and finally, address some free speech concerns 
regarding claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment.  
Before attempting to understand free speech, I first must define speech and free speech. In 
the legal sense, speech is best understood not as verbal language use but as an act of communication 
or expression.  There are things we consider speech in the ordinary sense and things we consider 95
speech in the free speech sense. Saying, “I will pay you ten thousand dollars to kill my wife,” is, in 
the ordinary sense, speech. The sentence is an utterance of words communicating an idea, but such a 
sentence is not covered by free speech. The speech is not merely expressing some opinion, but 
rather, hiring someone to murder one’s wife. Thus, there is a distinction between speech in the 
ordinary sense and that which is covered by free speech.  
What is covered by free speech continues to be a contentious topic and need not be 
explicitly defined for the purposes of this thesis; however, we must define speech in the ordinary 
sense that is not considered speech in the ‘free speech’ sense. What is not covered by free speech, 
but is speech in the ordinary sense, are communicative acts that the government has a compelling 
and justified state interest in regulating. Consider an example in which a company lawyer writes an 
employee contract that an Employee A signs. That contract is essentially an agreement, in which the 
employee agrees to carry out certain duties and abide by certain rules in exchange for the employer 
95 Schauer, F. (2015). On the Distinction between Speech and Action. ​Emory Law Journal​, ​65​(2), 427–454.  
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agreeing to pay the employee for a length of time. A similar agreement might be made by two 
teenagers betting – the first friend saying to the second one, “I’ll pay you 15 dollars if you jump in 
the pool right now,” and the second one responding, “I’ll do it.” This agreement consists of the 
second friend agreeing to carry out a duty (jumping in the pool) in exchange for the first friend 
agreeing to pay him. But the government has a compelling interest in regulating the employment 
agreement, but little interest in regulating an agreement about jumping into a pool. Both are 
agreements, and thus speech in the ordinary sense, but the government only has a compelling state 
interest in regulating the employment agreement, and thus, it is subject to regulation. Thus, a 
contract that the government has a compelling state interest is not speech in the free speech sense of 
the word.  
Furthermore, some utterances that constitute crimes are speech in the ordinary sense but not 
subject to free speech protections. Consider a husband who says to an assassin, “I will pay you ten 
thousand dollars to kill my wife.” That utterance is not covered by free speech because it is 
committing a crime in hiring an assassin. The government has a justified interest in outlawing the 
hiring of criminals for murder, and so the utterance is subject to being outlawed. There are similar 
crimes – i.e. solicitation, insider trading, witness intimidation – that are speech in the sense that they 
are communicative acts, but their communication constitutes an action that the government has a 
compelling reason to regulate and thus is not considered to be “speech” in the free speech sense.  
Of course, that which is covered by free speech includes some instances of expression that 
are not speech. For example, the Supreme Court ruled that the burning of the American flag 
“constituted expressive conduct.”  Even within the category of what we consider expressive 96
96 ​Texas v. Johnson​, 491 U.S. 397, 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2535, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989) 
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conduct (that which is speech in the free speech sense), there exists speech that is regulated. 
Consider the act of defamation – I may write an opinion piece in a newspaper in which I say, of 
some public figure, “Mr. Jones is an alcoholic,” in an effort to reduce the sales of Mr. Jones’ book 
and perhaps damage his reputation. It is speech in which there may be an expression of somewhat 
political ideas, but it is actionable if and only if what was communicated is proven to be false, that I 
failed to take reasonable actions to verify if the information was false (negligence) or I knew it to be 
false and acted anyway (malice), and the communication must cause injury, either through material 
losses or reputational damages.  Unlike the cases of contract killing, solicitation, insider trading, and 97
witness intimidation, in the case of defamation, the utterance itself is not legally actionable. It is that 
the utterance causes injury that makes it actionable. In the case of contract killing, merely saying “I 
will pay you ten thousand dollars to kill my wife,” is a crime that warrants legal action, regardless of 
whether the hit-man actually hurts my wife. However, saying, “Mr. Jones is an alcoholic” does not, 
by itself, justify legal action. Legal action can only be successful if Mr. Jones can prove he is both not 
an alcoholic and that my statement was injurious to him. The utterance itself then is not justifiably 
legally actionable.  
Underlying the distinction above is the assumption that there is a higher standard of 
justification to regulate speech (that is, speech in the free speech sense) than is necessary to regulate 
action.  This is the free speech principle; the idea that speech requires a higher level of justification 98
for regulation  as compared to other forms of conduct. This presupposes that there is something 99
special about speech that makes it different and thus more deserving of protection than other 
97 ​New York Times Co. v. Sullivan​, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) 
98 Schauer, F. (1993). The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm. ​Ethics,​ ​103​(4), 637. 
99 From this point forward, “speech” will be used to mean speech in the free speech sense of speech as 
expressive conduct that does not constitute a crime.  
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actions.  There are many reasons for believing in the free speech principle. Philosopher John Stuart 100
Mill, mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, argued that freedom of expression must be 
protected to allow for the pursuit of the truth and knowledge.  Consider a claim, X. According to 101
Mill, no matter the truth value of X, prohibiting the expression of X is detrimental.  Because Mill 102
believes all knowledge is gained from experience, he argues that our beliefs must be open to 
reconsideration upon the introduction of new evidence.​  So, even if we think X to be false, it is 103
possible that X is true, and thus, it should not be suppressed. True beliefs are often suppressed 
because they are thought to be false.​  Even if X is actually false, it should not be suppressed. 104
Rather, false beliefs should be welcome because they lead to debate and a greater pursuit of 
knowledge.  105
Take, for instance, the case of Galileo Galilei, who was punished by the Church for holding 
what the Church saw as false beliefs of heliocentrism, the view that the planets circled the sun. Of 
course, we now know that the Church was the holder of false beliefs, not Galileo. But it was only 
after Galileo’s belief, initially deemed false, that other astronomers and scientists further investigated 
the issue and were able to gather more knowledge of astronomy. What is deemed false one day may 
turn out to be true upon further evidence, so suppressing a belief that is considered false may be 
suppressing a true belief.​  ​Furthermore, even if a false belief turns out to be false, there is value in 106
assessing the justification of the beliefs we hold to be true.  Of course, some beliefs are neither 107
100 Schauer, F. (1993). The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm.  
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entirely true nor entirely false, but evaluating them leads to greater discourse that can be knowledge 
producing. Listening to different beliefs, even if we think they could be false, can help us clarify 
what we believe is true, why we have those beliefs, and what evidence we have for them. Although 
this argument has great merit, this thesis will ultimately argue that when the expression of false 
beliefs constitutes an action that the government has a compelling and justified interest in 
preventing, such expressions ought to be suppressed. 
Other philosophers find that free speech must be protected to sustain a healthy democracy. 
One argument for this is that free speech, and the freedom of the press, are essential in keeping the 
public informed in their political decision making.​  Others argue that because a democratic 108
government has authority only because it is vested in her by the people, it is wrong to use that 
authority to censor them.​  Additionally, some think freedom of speech is essential to respecting 109
and maintaining the individual autonomy necessary for free thought.  Upon these arguments, 110
freedom of speech is essential for a functioning democracy.  Some free speech skeptics, like Free 111
Speech scholar Fredrick Schauer, argue that speech deserves no special protection; and it only 
currently has such protections because of enduring circumstances and a series of historical 
contingencies.  112
Even if speech deserves special protections, I will prove that the speech at play in hostile 
work environment meets the heightened standards required to regulate it. Free speech legal scholar 
Eugene Volokh worries about the precedent set by Robinson (1991)​, ​arguing that this understanding 
108 van Mill, D. Freedom of Speech. ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ​(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. 
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of hostile environment harassment can restrict free speech.  Volokh does not think quid pro quo 113
harassment, unwanted, physical touching, discriminatory job assignments, and unwanted one-to-one 
speech concern the First Amendment. For Volokh, those are instances of speech that are and 
should continue to be regulated because of a compelling state interest. However, he believes that 
“one to many” communication should be protected.  Under his definitions, “one-to-many” 114
communication includes posters, newsletters, and conversations involving willing listeners.  He 115
thinks this speech is especially valuable and thus argues this speech is and should remain protected:  
One-to-many speech … is generally constitutionally protected even when some of its viewers are 
likely to be offended. So long as some of the viewers are likely to be open to the message, 
the message remains protected, precisely because restricting the message would cut off 
constitutionally valuable communication to willing listeners as well as constitutionally 
valueless communication to unwilling listeners.  116
Volokh believes this one-to-many communication ought to be protected because it may be 
‘constitutionally valuable,’ meaning it may lead to an exchange of ideas, political discourse, and 
perhaps a pursuit of knowledge.  117
However, the one-to-many communication Volokh is speaking of includes the posters of 
nude women, the pictures ripped from “Penthouse” and Playboy, and the sexually explicit calendars 
mentioned in Robinson (1991) that the court found to be sexually suggestive.  In the case of 118
113 ​Volokh, E. (1996). Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment 
Harassment. ​Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law,​ ​17​(20), 305-312. 
114 ​Ibid​, ​311. 
115 ​Volokh, E. (1996).Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment 
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Robinson (1991), many of the viewers were ‘open to the message’ of nude and degraded women, 
mainly, the men who worked at the shipyard.​  What Volokh fails to realize is that the women who 119
constitute the “unwilling listeners” are not merely offended. They are harmed in such a way where 
they do not have the same access to their work environment as their male peers. Furthermore, 
Volokh is arguing that the content of the message is “constitutionally valuable communication to 
willing listeners.”​  Volokh thinks much art, which he believes has First Amendment protections 120
even in the workplace, would fall under this definition.  His concern is then that the “speech” 121
restrictions in established Robinson (1991) will only grow larger; arguing that “Narrow speech 
restrictions do over time lead to broader ones.”  And he provides evidence to back up this 122
position, noting the Robinson (1991) was cited by Penn State administrators who took down Goya's 
Naked Maja​ after a Professor complained it constituted sexual harassment.  
Although I agree some art, which may fall under the Court’s definition of “sexually 
suggestive” pictures, may lead to constitutionally valuable communication, unilaterally allowing such 
sexually suggestive and explicit images in the workplace would be tolerating discrimination against 
women and unequal access for the mere possibility of constitutionally valuable communication. 
Volokh argues that this speech should not be regulated although it may cause harm, but this is a 
misconception of the harm of speech in this situation. It is not that the “sexually suggestive” 
pictures may​ cause​ discrimination, but rather, that in certain contexts they ​are​ discrimination. I will 
further detail the distinction between the constitution of harm and the causation of harm in the next 
119 ​Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,​ Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
120 Volokh, E. (2013). One-To-One Speech Vs. One-To-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and 
“Cyberstalking.” 742. 
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chapter. In the final chapter of this thesis, I will respond to Volokh’s argument, explaining why the 
first amendment is not applicable to workplace speech that creates a hostile work environment.  
Furthermore, Volokh argues that the standard established in Robinson (1991) is inconsistent 
with the First Amendment’s protection the court has shown in other cases, like Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville (1975), in which the court ruled that a city ordinance outlawing a drive-in movie theater 
from exhibiting films containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place, 
violated First Amendment rights.  I disagree with Volokh’s assertion that these cases represent an 123
inconsistent application of the First Amendment. In Erznoznik (1975), the protected speech was 
nudity in a film at a drive-in theater,​  and in Robinson (1991), the outlawed “speech” was nude and 124
often pornographic images of women hung up in a Shipyard.​  The nudity in the film at the drive-in 125
theater is appropriate for the business. A theater, presumably, should show films. However, the 
photographs and graffiti on the walls of JSI were not appropriate for the business. Had the 
photographs of women in various stages of undress been hung up in, perhaps, the office of Playboy 
or Penthouse, they would have been necessary for the business conducted there. But JSI is a 
shipyard, and their mission has nothing to do with displaying pornography. Furthermore, it was the 
psychological damage of the pornographic images displayed around JSI, not their mere presence, 
that led the court to their decision. The speech was harmful, and harmful because it gave Robinson 
unequal access to the workplace because of her sex, thus violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
The nudity present in the films in Erznoznik (1975) presented no such harm, and thus, the court 
protected their speech.  
123 ​Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,​ 422 U.S. 205, 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 2270, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) 
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43 
 
Volokh disagrees with the notion that harassing speech is harmful speech and thus should 
not be protected by the First Amendment.  Volokh argues that lots of speech is ‘offensive’ but 126
protected by free speech, even within a workplace.  Boycotts, which the court found to be 127
protected political speech in​ ​N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co (1982)​, have tangible harm 
and millions of dollars in damages.  Furthermore, malicious parodies, true but cruel or unfair 128
statements, and abstract teaching of violence or lawlessness are all protected speech with potentially 
great harms.  Volokh then argues that “if one approves of the protection given to harmful speech, 129
one can't then just argue that speech which "caus[es] foreseeable injury to another" is unprotected. 
One has to explain why harassing speech is different.”  In the next chapter of this thesis, I will do 130
just that, by explaining some concepts from philosophy of language and explicating the distinction 
between constitution and causation of harm. In the last chapter of this thesis, I will fully address 
Volokh’s argument after having explored the distinction between constitution and causation of 
harm.  
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Chapter 5: Language Tools  
The previous chapter briefly outlined and addressed some free speech concerns regarding 
claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment. In this chapter, I will explain some relevant 
elements of philosophy of language that will prove useful in my later analysis of a case of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment. Much of this chapter draws on work from philosophers of 
language from the mid to late twentieth century, who expanded philosophy of language to include 
not only an analysis of the literal meaning of utterances, but to include an analysis of the many 
things we ​do​ with language.  I will first provide a brief overview of speech act theory and 131
implicature, and then go on to explain the difference between constituting and causing harm.  
1 § Speech Act Theory 
In ​How To Do Things With Words,​ J. L. Austin introduces the idea that there are some 
utterances that do not merely ​describe​ action, but actually ​are ​action.  If I were to say, “I proposed to 132
her,” that utterance would be describing my action of proposing to someone. However, if I utter, 
“Will you marry me?” to a longtime partner, the utterance is not describing the action of proposing, 
it actually​ is​ the act of proposal. Austin dubs these utterances, that constitute the performance of an 
action, “performatives.”​  Those utterances are in contrast to constative utterances, which make a 133
statement. Constatives ​say​ things, and can be assessed as true or false, but performatives ​do ​things, 
and can be successful or unsuccessful.  For example, the constative utterance, “I proposed to 134
her,” can be true or false, if I actually did propose to her or not. However, “I recommend that you 
131 Green, M. (Winter 2018) "Speech Acts", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ​Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL 
= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/speech-acts/>. 





propose to her,” cannot be true or false. A speaker cannot falsely recommend. They can make such 
a recommendation in bad faith, or the hearer can choose to ignore the recommendation, but the 
speaker makes a recommendation regardless of the hearer’s decision to act upon such a 
recommendation. It may be an unsuccessful recommendation, but the action of recommending 
occurs regardless.  
Austin establishes four conditions necessary for a performative to be successful. If one of 
these conditions is not met, the act constitutes a misfire, meaning the performative utterance was 
spoken, but not successfully performed.​  First, there must be an accepted conventional procedure. 135
 Society has certain socially constructed conventional procedures that allow for the utterances of 136
particular words in a particular context to constitute a certain type of action. For example, saying “I 
do” sometimes counts as marrying because of convention and laws surrounding marrying in the 
United States, but the same utterance may not constitute marrying in another country that has 
different conventions surrounding marriage.  
That the societal ​convention ​that allows the utterance to count as the action it does is distinct 
from the utterance being spoken in the appropriate ​circumstances​. That is the second condition, that 
the particular speakers and circumstances must be appropriate for such a procedure.  If someone 137
were to say “I do,” at their wedding standing at the altar with their fiance, they would be speaking 
the utterance in the appropriate circumstances for the utterance to count as marrying. However, if 
they said, “I do,” at an altar on a television set while filming a television wedding, their utterance 
would not count as marrying because the circumstances are not appropriate, which prevents them 
135 Austin, J. L. (1962). ​How to do things with words​. 1-12. 




from invoking the convention. For the utterance to count as marrying, they must be following the 
societal ​convention,​ and they must be doing so within the appropriate ​circumstance.​ Furthermore, third 
condition is that the procedure must be executed correctly.  If the fiance at the altar says, “I don’t,” 138
the act of marrying does not occur. The fourth condition is that it must be executed completely; if 
the priest leaves in the middle of the ceremony, the couple does not get married.   139
Additionally, Austin introduces two conditions that if not met, make a performative 
utterance less than ideal, or as he refers to them, “unhappy.”  The first is that if the performative 140
utterance should be accompanied by certain thoughts, emotions, intentions or feelings from the 
speaker, then that person ought to have those required thoughts, emotions, intentions or feelings.​  141
For example, if I promise to go to a friend’s party, I ought to intend to go when I make that 
promise. If I didn’t, I would be making an insincere promise, which is less than ideal. However, even 
an insincere promise is still a promise. My promise is still a performative utterance, but it is an 
unhappy one. The second condition is that the person must actually perform the subsequent 
behavior expected on the basis of the promise.​  I may intend on going to my friend’s party when I 142
promise her that I would, but I may end up not going. This is a broken but sincere promise. But that 
it is a broken promise does not mean that I didn’t promise my friend I would go to her party; it is 
still a promise, although not ideal.  
Austin then distinguishes between the three forces of an utterances. If I were to say to you, 
in my dining room “Set the table,” my utterance would have three forces. The first is the locutionary 
138 Austin, J. L. (1962). Lecture VIII-Lecture XI in ​How to do things with words​. 94-147. 
139 Ibid; 94-147. 





force, which is the content of what is said; the semantic meaning of my words.  In this case, the 143
utterance has the meaning “Set the table,” with ‘set’ referring to putting out the necessary tableware 
and ‘the table’ referring to the dining table in front of us. The second force is the illocutionary force, 
which is the act constituted by the utterance. It is what the speaker does when they say something; 
urge, whine, warn, demand, etc. When I say “Set the table,” the illocutionary force is that I ordered 
you to set the table.​  There is also the perlocutionary force, which is the causal effect of the 144
utterance on the hearer.  So, the perlocutionary force would be that you have been persuaded or 145
convinced to set the table. This perlocutionary force is distinct from the explicit meaning of my 
words (locutionary force) and the act constituted by the utterance (illocutionary force).  146
Austin also makes the distinction between explicit and implicit illocution. In the case of 
setting the table if I was to say, “I’m ordering you to set the table,” the speech act performed would 
be explicit. I inform you of my illocutionary force by saying the word “ordering.” However, if I was 
to just say, “Set the table,” I would still be ordering you to set the table. However, this case is 
implicit illocution, as I do not explicitly state my illocutionary force.   147
The first condition on Austin’s view of performatives mentioned above is the notion that all 
performatives must have an accepted convention. Consider marriage, in which the utterance “I do” 
socially counts as marrying in the proper circumstances because of the accepted conventional 
procedure of marriage in the United States. Convention is then what allows the utterances of 
particular people in particular circumstances to constitute marrying. Austin is a force 
143 Ibid. 






conventionalist, meaning that he believes there must be a convention for an utterance to constitute 
action.   148
Furthermore, Austin comes to argue that whether an utterance is performative or constative 
is a matter of degree, and utterances are often not “purely” one or the other.  Furthermore, we 149
should think of different types of speech acts not as strictly distinct categories, but as “more general 
families,” that may relate to and overlap each another.  He introduces five categories of speech 150
acts: verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives. For the purposes of this 
paper, only verdictives and exercitives are of concern. Verdictives are speech acts that have the 
illocutionary force of rendering a verdict.  Take the instance of a referee who calls a ball “out.” In 151
uttering, “out” the referee not only changes the course of the game by determining who gets the ball 
but makes an authoritative judgement about an antecedent matter of fact, that the ball was out of 
bounds. The verdict is then making a decision about what happened in the past and fixing what 
happens going forward.  
Exercitives are speech acts giving a decision that attempts to fix a certain course of action. 
Unlike verdictives, they don’t attempt to track what happened in the past. Exercitives often have the 
illocutionary force of granting or denying power, rights, or authority to people.  Consider a judge 152
who says, “The defendant is sentenced to life in prison,” during a sentencing hearing. The exercitive 
determines the course of action the legal system will take, but it does not purport to describe an 
antecedent fact about the defendant in the way the verdictive “We find the defendant guilty,” does. 
148 Green, M. (Winter 2017 Edition) "Speech Acts", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​. 






Verdictives and exercitives are both exercises of speaker authority. If a courtroom observer stood up 
and said the same thing as the foreman or the judge, their words would have the same locutionary 
force. Both statements would have the same semantic meaning. However, the bystander’s statement 
would not have the same illocutionary force. The bystander merely makes an observation, whereas 
the jury foreman delivers a verdict, and the judge fixes a course of action. Their statements have the 
same locutionary force, but their authority gives them different illocutionary force. There is 
something about the authority of the foreman and the judge that allows for their speech act to count 
for more in these situations.  
Some philosophers, including P. F. Strawson, think that although some illocutionary acts, 
especially ceremonial performatives, may follow conventional procedures, not all do.​  Thus, 153
Strawson argues that the illocutionary force of many speech-acts can be explained through a 
speaker’s communicative intentions and the audience’s recognition of that intention.​  Consider an 154
example of a child who really wants a certain toy. Upon seeing it at the mall, the child asks for it, but 
his mother says, “Your birthday is coming up soon, maybe you’ll get it then.” The mother intends 
for her child to recognize her intention to deny him the toy. The mother’s utterance thus denies her 
child the toy not because she said “I deny you this toy” or “You cannot have it,” but because the 
mother intends for the utterance to be a denial, intends for the child to recognize her utterance as a 
denial, and for the child to recognize her intention for the utterance to be a denial. If the child did 
not recognize his mother’s intention because he did not hear or understand her, and asked again for 
the toy, he would not have understood his mother’s denial. Whether his mother’s utterance 





constitutes a denial or merely a failed attempt at one depends on how necessary one finds audience 
uptake, the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s intentions, to be. The child could also recognize 
his mother’s intention to for him to recognize her intention to deny him the toy and simply choose 
to ignore it and ask for the toy again. Unlike the instance of the child not recognizing his mother’s 
intention, in the case of the child who ignores his mother’s intention, the denial is successfully 
communicated to the child but ignored.  
2 § Implicature 
Speech act theory was not the only philosophical development in the analysis of ordinary 
usage of language. Philosopher of language Paul Grice argued that how we understand the meaning 
of a speaker’s words is highly contextual, and often comes from what is implied rather than what is 
said.  One such way this occurs is through “conversational implicature.” For example, if I were 155
asked whether a potential blind date was smart, and got the response, “He’s very attractive and 
athletic,” what’s being implied is that the person is not smart, but attractive and athletic. Underlying 
the Gricean analysis of conversation is the assumption that most speakers are abiding by the 
cooperative principle, that one should “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you 
are engaged.”  The cooperative principle describes how most people participate in conversations.  156
Furthermore, there are four maxims that govern the rules of conversation: relation, quantity, 
quality, and manner.​  The relation maxim exhorts what the speaker says be relevant.  If I asked if 157 158







potential blind date is smart and receive the response, “He’s attractive and athletic,” in order for the 
speaker to be following the relevance maxim, “He’s not very smart” must be implicated. Consider 
another example, if I were to say, “Where is the bathroom?” and my interlocutor responded, 
“Apples can be green or red,” she would be ignoring the relevance maxim. The maxim of quantity 
assumes the speaker will make contributions as informative as is necessary; not more or less.​  If I 159
was to say, “Where is the bathroom?” and my interlocutor responded, “On Earth,” they would be 
disregarding the quantity maxim by providing me with inadequate information. The quality maxim is 
that the speaker will not say what they do not have adequate evidence to support.  If I was to say, 160
“Where is the bathroom?” and my interlocutor responded, “To the left and down the hall,” but had 
never been there before and did not have any idea where the bathroom was, they would be breaking 
the quality maxim. Finally, the last maxim is manner, which states that the speaker should be clear in 
their utterances.  This means they are not using obscure language or expressions; they are not 161
being unnecessarily vague or protracted, or unorganized.  If I asked where the bathroom was, and 162
my instructor responded, “It’s, two hops down yonder, but there’s a peeler outside if you get lost,” 
they would not be abiding by the manner maxim because they would be using obscure language.  
Conversational implicature thus occurs when a speaker utters “X,” the speaker is presumably 
following the rules of conversation (mainly abiding by the cooperative principle), Y must be 
implicated by X in order for the speaker to be following the rules of the conversation, and that the 
audience is able to figure that out.  Most interlocutors are abiding by the cooperative principle. The 163








cooperative principle is the bare minimum of communicative cooperation, not necessarily abiding by 
all four maxims, although some audiences might assume that the speaker is guided by the four 
maxims. So, when I say, “Where is the bathroom?” and my interlocutor responds, “This is my first 
time in this building,” I assume they are not breaking the relevance maxim. Rather, I take my 
interlocutor to be implicating that they do not know where the bathroom is located. This is not to 
say that speakers who break the maxims are not abiding by the cooperative principle; speakers can 
be both cooperative and break a maxim. For example, a speaker may flout a maxim, meaning they 
blatantly break a maxim in an attempt to achieve a desired effect, which is usually sarcastic or ironic 
implicature. A sarcastic speaker might respond to the question of “Where is the bathroom?” with 
“Somewhere in the building,” flouting the quality maxim to mock their interlocutor.  
3 § Distinguishing the Constitution and Causation of Harm 
These tools from philosophy of language will guide the analysis of the case in the next 
chapter of this thesis. Before doing that, however, this section will make the distinction between 
causing and constituting harm. Consider two cases of a private religious school in which a gay 
student running for prom queen is harmed by her principal’s actions. In the first case, the principal 
is helping the student with her college admissions essay. In the essay, the student talks openly about 
her sexuality. While revising it with the student, the principle accidently presses the intercom button, 
and says about the essay, “Sarah, I think there’s a spelling error in the paragraph where you talk 
about being gay.” As a result of this utterance, the whole school learns of the student’s sexuality. 
The vast majority of students happen to be homophobic, and as a result of being outed by her 
principal, the student loses the vote for prom queen. His utterance then provided the information 
that enabled​ ​the students to discriminate against the student, and thus ​causes​ harm. The illocutionary 
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force, the act constituted by the utterance, may not have been an act of discrimination, but an 
attempt at helping her with the paper. But the perlocutionary force, which is the causal effect of the 
utterance on the hearer, is that the students know the candidate is gay, and resulting from that 
knowledge, they don’t elect her prom queen.  So although the overheard statement has the 164
illocutionary force of an observation, it has the perlocutionary force of informing the students of the 
candidate’s sexuality, and thus ​causes discrimination. 
Now consider a case in which the principal’s actions do not just cause discrimination, but 
actually constitute it. The principal calls the student into his office and says, “You cannot run for 
prom queen because you are gay.” Like the last case, this statement ​causes ​the student to not be able 
to win, and thus ​causes​ harm. However, unlike the last case of the principal accidentally outing the 
student, the principal is banning the gay student from running for prom queen with this utterance. 
The principal’s utterance is then an exercitive, as it exercises the principal’s authority by giving a 
decision that attempts to set a certain course of action. The principal’s utterance fixes a course of 
action in which the student will have unfair treatment  on the basis of her sexuality, and thus enacts 
discriminatory norms. These discriminatory norms are not just the unfair treatment of the student 
on the basis of her sexuality. Just in his utterance that attempts to ban this student from running, the 
principal treats her worse because of her sexuality without proper justification by making 
discrimination on the basis of sexuality more normal, and thus, enacting discriminatory norms. It is 
not just the perlocutionary force of the principal’s utterance that causes others to discriminate; the 
utterance itself constitutes discrimination. But perhaps the student decides to ignore the principal 
and run regardless. That does not mean she didn’t face discrimination from the principle. Even his 
164 Austin, J. L. (1962). Lecture XII in ​How to do things with words​.  
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ban is unsuccessful, his utterance is an exercitive that creates discriminatory norms, but does not 
produce the intended result. In sum, the principal’s utterance is an exercitive that constitutes 
discrimination by creating discriminatory norms in which the student will have unfair treatment on 
the basis of her sexuality.  
Philosopher Rae Langton provides one way to differentiate between an utterance that causes 
discrimination and one that constitutes it. In ​Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts​, Langton builds off 
legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon’s claims that pornography constitutes, and not merely causes, 
the subjugation of women.​  Langton defines subordination as that which unfairly ranks certain 165
people as inferior, legitimates discriminatory behavior towards them, or deprives them of powers 
and rights. Langton argues that pornography that depicts women being violently, sexually degraded, 
is both a verdictive and exercitive speech act that constitutes subordination.​  Such pornography is 166
verdictive, as it unfairly ranks women as submissive sex objects, and exercitive, by fixing a course of 
action by conditioning its consumers to sexualize violence against women.  Thus, by Langton’s 167
view, pornography speech constitutes subordination by unfairly ranking women as submissive sex 
objects and thus inferior, and by legitimating discriminatory behavior towards them by conditioning 
men to sexualize violence against women.  
You might think this is just causal and not constitutive because viewers are being casually 
effected. However, one might think that a viewer may not choose to believe the actions depicted are 
acceptable, and thus, pornography merely causes the sexualization of violence against women among 
some viewers. However, pornography has a unique purpose in that it is “masturbation material,” 






whose purpose is sexual gratification, and the content of pornography conditions what it’s viewers 
find sexually attractive.​  The content, in virtue of being pornography, not only depicts the sexual 168
degradation of women, but conditions the viewer to find pleasure in watching such degradation.  169
Thus, unlike a documentary or news story about pornography, pornography depicts the sexual 
degradation of woman for the purpose of the sexual gratification of the viewer.​  However, this 170
does not mean pornography is only that which is made with the intention to be pornography. The 
purpose does not have to be intended by the creator of the content when making the material; 
memoirs describing the violence, rape, and torture of performers in the adult industry have been 
marketed as pornography.  In those cases, the author’s intent was to produce disgust rather than 171
sexual gratification, but by advertising such content next to adult erotic novels, it is marketed for the 
purposes of sexual gratification and therefore, in this context and for this audience, it is used as and 
thus becomes pornography.  What makes such stories pornography is then not the speaker’s 172
intention, but that the stories are used for the purposes of pornography and produce the same 
effects of conditioning the viewer to find pleasure in the sexual degradation of women. 
Using Langton’s reasoning, I argue that such an argument can be applied to speech that 
constitutes discrimination. Speech that endorses the permissibility of discrimination is, itself, 
discriminatory. In the next chapter, I will argue that harassing speech is harmful in and of itself. It is 
not speech that advocates or proposes discrimination, it is speech that actually discriminates. By 
168 Langton, R. (1993). pp. 293-330. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid, 321. Langton uses the example of Linda Marchiano’s autobiography ​Ordeal​, where she recalls being 
beaten, raped, and tortured to perform as Linda Lovelace in ​Deep Throat, ​and which later appeared in a 





creating a work environment hostile to women because of their gender, the harassing speech 
prevents equal access to the workplace and discriminates against women. Thus, for utterances that 
are hostile work environment sexual harassment, discrimination is not a consequence of the speech, 
rather, the speech is an act of discrimination. To do this, I will analyze the case presented at the 
beginning of this thesis to argue that because this harassing speech is different, it should not be 




Chapter 6: Original Case Analysis 
The introduction of this thesis began by describing a conversation between Kevin, Susan, 
and Will, three co-workers at a corporate office of a large technology company. Recall that the three 
of them share a large office, where each individual has a desk, and that the three are all equals in the 
office; no one person has authority than another, and they all report to the same supervisor. After 
performance reviews are emailed back, this conversation occurs: 
Kevin: Did you guys get your performance reviews back?. 
Will: Yep. I didn’t do so well. 
Susan: I actually did fairly well. 
Kevin: Me too, I did better than I expected. 
Will: Well, not all of us have a chest like Susan’s or legs like Kevin’s 
Kevin and Will laugh at this, but Susan doesn’t find this to be all that funny. She actually finds Will’s 
joke, and Kevin’s reaction, to be really upsetting. She hopes Will doesn’t actually think she got a 
good performance review because of her body, but even if he was ‘just joking,’ she feels 
uncomfortable. She didn’t think she worked in a place where that kind of joke was ‘okay.’ This may 
seem like a “harmless” joke, but in this chapter, I will prove that Will’s utterance constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of sex.  
1§ Speech Act Analysis 
This section will explain the implicature and linguistic forces of Will’s utterance. Conversational 
implicature occurs when a speaker utters “X,” the speaker is presumably following the rules of 
conversation, Y must be implicated by X in order for the speaker to be following the rules of the 
conversation, and that the audience is able to figure out that Y must be implicated by X in order for 
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the speaker to be following the rules of the conversation.​  In this case, Will is following the rules 173
of the conversation and utters “Well unfortunately, not all of us have a chest like Susan’s or legs like 
Kevin’s.” In order for Will to be following the rules of the conversation, his utterance must be 
relevant to what was just said by Susan and Kevin. Susan and Kevin said that they did well on their 
performance reviews. Thus, Will’s utterance “Well not all of us have a chest like Susan’s or legs like 
Kevin’s,” must be relevant to the conversation about how well Kevin and Susan did on their 
performance reviews and how badly Will did on his. Will’s utterance thus implies that having a chest 
like Susan’s or legs like Kevin’s is relevant to their performance reviews, the utterance implies that 
the Susan and Kevin did well on their performance reviews ​because of​ these specific body parts. 
Furthermore, Will and Kevin find the ‘leg’s like Kevin’ part of the utterance to be funny because it 
flouts the relevance maxim. In flouting the relevance maxim, the resulting implicature (that Kevin’s 
legs might be relevant to the performance review) is absurd and thus humorous to them. Susan and 
Kevin are able to figure this out, and thus, this is what Will’s utterance implies. This diminishes 
Susan’s work towards her performance review by reducing her accomplishments to her body, but it 
does not do the same to Kevin because that part of the utterance flouts the relevance maxim in an 
attempt to be funny. 
Even so, it looks as if this analysis might unfairly assume that Will is not flouting the relevance 
maxim when he talks about Susan’s chest. If he is flouting the relevance maxim when talking about 
Kevin, it seems like he could be doing the same thing when he talks about Susan. This 
counterargument, however, ignores the context in which Will is making his joke. The workplace, 
especially within a male-dominated fields like tech, does not have a history of being welcoming to 
173 Grice, H.P. (1975). "Logic and Conversation.” 
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women or taking their accomplishments seriously. Thus, commenting on a woman's body and 
suggesting that it is the reason she has done well in the workplace has a historical precedent, and 
reinforces existing harmful norms.  
2§ Context of Women in the Workforce 
To understand the historical precedent and social context in which Will’s comment was made, 
this thesis will rely on legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon’s analysis of women in the workplace. As 
discussed at the end of Chapter 3, MacKinnon argues that there are societal and systemic inequalities 
for women in the workforce, and such inequalities are reinforced and perpetuated by sexual 
harassment. Such inequalities include but are not limited to horizontal segregation (the statistical 
domination of a gender within certain gendered professions), vertical stratification (gendered status 
differentials within these professions), income inequality, and sex-defined work (professions in 
which one’s sex is considered essential to the position).  Although MacKinnon’s work was 174
published in 1979, recent studies indicate that these issues persist.  175
According to MacKinnon’s argument, these inequalities stem from a social context that 
defines womanhood through women’s sexualized bodies and compliance with male sexual advances, 
as evidenced by the tradition of women exchanging of sex for survival, through marriage or sex 
work, which ensured that women were sexually available to men and economically dependent on 
them.  Thus, women in the workplace exist within a larger historical and social context that values 176
their bodies for sex, and it does not do so for men.  
174 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​. 9-23. 
175 Charles, M. (2003). Deciphering Sex Segregation: Vertical and Horizontal Inequalities in Ten National 




When Will makes his utterance, he may not know about any of this history. Will may not 
have any idea of the historical context in which he makes his utterance. He is certainly not 
responsible or at fault for this history of women being subjugated and sexualized in the workplace. 
But that is not to say that Will cannot reinforce the norms created by these histories and perpetuate 
them through his own utterances. Discrimination need not be intentional, as shown in the chapter 1, 
and the same goes for speech that constitutes discrimination. Consider again the case memoirs 
describing the violence, rape, and torture of performers in the adult industry have been marketed as 
pornography.  In those cases, the author’s intent was to produce disgust rather than sexual 177
gratification, but the audience took it to be pornography, so it was used as and thus became 
pornography.  Will’s intention in making his utterance need not be to imply something sexist, make 178
sexist jokes permissible in the workplace, or make Susan uncomfortable. But if the audience takes it 
to do these things, and it functions as doing those things, then has the effect of actually doing those 
things.  
3 § Will’s Utterance Revisited 
In order to prove that Will’s utterance constitutes discrimination, I have to prove that this 
utterance treats Susan unfairly on the basis of her membership in a legally protected social group 
resulting in a legally recognized harm. First, consider how the utterance might constitute unfair 
treatment. The same thing is being said to both Kevin and Susan. They are both in the room when 
Will speaks, they are equals in authority at the accounting firm, and they both hear the utterance. On 
one level, the utterance implies the same thing about both of them: that they did well on their 
performance reviews because of their specific bodily traits.  




However, looking a bit closer, what is being implied about Susan is quite different than what 
is being implied about Kevin. Will’s utterance implies that Susan got a good performance review 
because of her chest. It also implies that Kevin did well because of his legs. However, this 
implicature is meant to be funny and absurd because Kevin is a man, and within the historical and 
societal context of the workforce, it is women, and not men, whose bodies have been sexualized and 
exchanged for economic good.  Thus, Will’s utterance really implies that Susan got a good 179
performance review because of her breasts, which is a physical characteristic most commonly 
associated with women, and that it is absurd and thus funny to think that Kevin got his good 
performance review because of his legs because he is a man, and men’s bodies are not sexualized or 
exchanged for workplace survival. Even though Will’s utterance is ‘just a joke,’ it’s implicature 
communicates that men exchanging their bodies for economic good is funny, but such behavior is 
expected and normal for women. Thus, Will’s utterance treats Susan unfairly on the basis of her sex. 
One might argue that because Will may not have intended to communicate the message that 
men exchanging their bodies for economic good is funny, but such behavior is expected and normal 
for women. However, intention is not required for every act of communication. I may pretend to be 
very wealthy, intending for my audience to think I have a great deal of money. I may also be very 
bad at pretending to be wealthy, and the message communicated to my audience is that I am 
pretending to be wealthy. In such I case, I failed to communicate my intended message, that I am 
wealthy, to the audience, but I succeeded in communicating to them that I am pretending to be 
wealthy. What the speaker intends for the audience to recognize need not match what the audience 
actually recognizes. 
179 ​MacKinnon, C. (1979). ​Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination​. 174-178. 
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Furthermore, in order for Will’s utterance to constitute discrimination, it must result in some 
legally recognized harm. Susan feeling vaguely uncomfortable by Will’s utterance is not sufficient. As 
established in ​Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986),​ unequal access to the workplace on the basis 
of sex is a sufficient legally recognized harm.​  ​The victim need not prove physical or psychological 180
injury caused by the hostility of the environment.  T​hus, to prove that Will’s utterance is 181
discriminatory exercitive, I must prove that the joke made the workplace less accessible to Susan 
because of her sex. To do so, I will examine how Will’s joke functions as an exercitive, how such an 
exercitive makes such jokes permissible, and how the permissibility of those jokes makes Susan less 
accessible to the workplace because of her gender.  
Will’s joke was successful as Susan and Kevin understood his implicature and Kevin laughed. 
Thus, Will effectively communicated that men exchanging their bodies for economic good is funny, 
but such behavior is expected and normal for women. In communicating such a message, Will did 
not just communicate the literal content of his words. He also communicated that such an utterance, 
and what it implies, is permissible within the workplace. Furthermore, he was successful in doing 
this. Kevin laughed, and nothing else was said on the matter. The joke is, in fact, permissible in 
workplace, and Will helped make that so.  
The utterance thus has the exercitive force of fixing a workplace culture in which such jokes 
are permissible. However, exercitives are exercises in speaker authority, and it seems unclear if Will 
has the authority to fix the rules of what jokes are permissible in the workplace.  Consider a 182
different conversation between a mother, a father, and their child. The mother and father curse 
180 ​Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson​, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986).  
181 ​Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc.​ (1993). 
182 ​Austin, J. L. (1962). Lecture VIII. 
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around each other, but never in front of their child. One day, the child curses front of her parents, 
and the mother and father scold her for doing so, saying, “If you use swear words again, you’ll have 
to put a dollar in the swear jar.” In doing this, they are fixing the rules of what words are acceptable 
in conversation between them. This is an exercise of their speaker authority, which they clearly have 
over a child. Now consider the parents conversing with other parents at a dinner party. A guest 
begins to talk about politics. The other parents did not know this was a permissible topic of 
conversation, as some people choose to keep these matters private. By candidly discussing politics, 
the guest has changed the rules of the conversation by inserting politics into the domain of 
conversation. The other parents, or perhaps the host of the party, could stop her, and ask her not to 
talk about this topic, and thus change the rules of the conversation.  However, if they do not, the 183
rules of the conversation were changed, and the speaker had no more authority than the other 
parents.  Thus, it seems that the speaker does not need authority over her audience to 184
effect/change what utterances are permissible.  Rather, if her audience does not object, she has 185
the requisite authority to dictate the rules of conversation. This is the same for Will. He does not 
need to have been explicitly vested with the authority to dictate the rules of the conversation. But if 
the audience takes him to do have such authority, and the utterance functions as if he has that 
authority, then his utterance has the effect of him having such authority.  
Although Susan might not think the implicature of Will’s statement is permissible, Will still 
communicates the harmful notion that men exchanging their bodies for economic good is funny, 
but such behavior is expected and normal for women. His utterance is not taken to be an attempt at 
183 ​McGowan, Mary Kate (2004). Conversational exercitives: Something else we do with our words. ​Linguistics 





educating his coworkers on sex inequities in workplace culture, but a joke, and one that Kevin finds 
funny. That it is a taken as a joke and taken to be an acceptable one in that it goes unchallenged, 
such jokes become acceptable. Consider Langton’s analogous view on pornography: when 
depictions of violence against women are taken to be pornography, and used for sexual gratification, 
they become pornography.  When a workplace joke is taken to be permissible, and goes 186
unchallenged, such jokes become permissible. In the case of the corporate office, such jokes have 
become permissible in the workplace because Will’s joke is successful.  
That such jokes are permissible in the workplace is unfair to Susan, and it is unfair because 
she is a woman, a legally recognized social group. Consider Susan and Kevin’s differing reactions to 
the joke. Kevin laughed and moved on. Susan felt uncomfortable, and she felt that way because of 
what Will said and because of her status as a woman. The implicature of Will’s joke, that men 
exchanging their bodies for economic good is funny, but such behavior is expected and normal for 
women, treats women worse than men by reinforcing harmful norms regarding the sexuality of 
women in the workplace. Will’s utterance therefore creates a work environment in which one can 
reinforce harmful ideas about women in the workplace, but one could never do the same for men in 
the workplace, because as a social group, men have dominance within the workplace. The workplace 
is one where women, and thus Sarah, face harmful norms about their sexuality that men do not. 
This gives her unequal access to the workplace when compared to her male peers, as she has to 
either put up with the harmful norms or try to change them. Kevin and Will do not, and thus, the 
workplace is more accessible to them.  
186 Langton, R. (2013). Pornography's Authority? Response to Leslie Green. In ​Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical 
Essays on Pornography and Objectification​ (pp. 89-102). Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 
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By communicating the permissibility of this notion, Will is communicating that jokes that 
treating men and women differently because of their differently sexualized bodies are acceptable, 
and thus, enacts norms regarding the permissibility of such jokes. After Will’s joke, the work 
environment is now one where such jokes are allowed, making the workplace less accessible to 
Susan because of her womanhood. Thus, Will’s utterance constitutes discrimination as an exercitive 
that makes jokes of treating men and women differently because of their differently sexualized 
bodies permissible, which prevents Susan from having equal access to the workplace because of her 
status as a woman. Speech that creates unequal access to the workplace, like Will’s utterance, is, 
itself, discriminatory. 
5 § Final Response to Volokh 
Now that this thesis has established the distinction between harm-causing speech and 
harm-constituting speech, I can respond to Volokh’s free speech concerns with harassment law. 
Volokh disagrees with the notion that harassing speech is harmful speech and thus should not be 
protected by the First Amendment.  Boycotts, which the court found to be protected political 187
speech in​ ​N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co (1982)​, have tangible harm and millions of dollars 
in damages.  Furthermore, malicious parodies, true but cruel or unfair statements, and abstract 188
teaching of violence or lawlessness are all protected speech with potentially great harms.   189
However, Volokh does not think speech that is discrimination is protected under free 
speech. For example, if an employer were to say, “We will not hire black people,” Volokh would 
187 ​Volokh, E. (1996). Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment 
Harassment. 313-315.  
188 ​N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co.​, 458 U.S. 886, 102 S. Ct. 3409, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215 (1982) 




cede that such an utterance is not protected under the first amendment. I have argued that Will’s 
utterance constitutes discrimination because it enacts norms regarding the permissibility of sexist 
jokes within the workplace. If I have done this successfully, then Volokh’s free speech concern is 
irrelevant to this utterance, because it constitutes discrimination. Speech that prevents Susan from 
having equal access to the workplace, like Will’s utterance, is discrimination, and thus should not be 
covered by the first amendment. By making a workplace less accessible to women because of their 
womanhood, the speech prevents equal access to the workplace, and is a harm, not just 
harm-causing. It is not merely the perlocutionary force of the utterances that cause discrimination, 
but that the utterance itself enacts the permissibility of sexist jokes and prevents equal access to the 
workplace. Thus, for utterances that are hostile work environment sexual harassment, discrimination 






In this thesis, I have investigated Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that sexual harassment is 
sex-based discrimination by explaining hostile work environment sexual harassment using 
philosophy of language. In the first chapter, I explained and defined discrimination as the unjustified 
and disadvantageous treatment based on one’s social group membership that constitutes a legally 
recognized harm and does not require intention. The second chapter explained discrimination on 
the basis of sex and analyzed Catharine MacKinnon’s legal argument that sexual harassment is 
sex-based discrimination, using ​Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986).​ The third chapter looked at 
three cases of this kind of harassment, explaining how each was an instance of sex-based 
discrimination. The fourth chapter outlined what free speech is, what it does, what we need to justify 
the regulation of speech, and presented some free speech concerns regarding claims of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment. The fifth chapter explains some relevant elements of philosophy of 
language, namely speech act theory, implicature, and the distinction between utterances that cause 
and constitute harm. Such tools proved useful in chapter six, where I provide an analysis of a case of 
hostile work environment sexual harassment, ultimately arguing that Will’s utterance constitutes, 
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